Washington Law Review
Volume 53

Number 4

10-1-1978

Jurisdiction to Zone Indian Reservations
Robert D. Wilson-Hoss

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr
Part of the Indigenous, Indian, and Aboriginal Law Commons, and the Jurisdiction Commons

Recommended Citation
Robert D. Wilson-Hoss, Comment, Jurisdiction to Zone Indian Reservations, 53 Wash. L. Rev. 677 (1978).
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.uw.edu/wlr/vol53/iss4/5

This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews and Journals at UW Law Digital
Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington Law Review by an authorized editor of UW Law Digital
Commons. For more information, please contact lawref@uw.edu.

JURISDICTION TO ZONE INDIAN
RESERVATIONS
During the nineteenth century, many Indian tribes granted the
United States government virtually all of their tribal lands in return
for the promise that their people could live without disturbance on
reservations.1 Today the extent to which Indians may live on their res2
ervations without interference is clouded by jurisdictional conflicts.
The primary adversaries are Indian tribes and local and state governments.3
A significant aspect of this jurisdictional controversy concerns the
power of tribal governments to enforce their civil regulatory laws on
reservation lands, including ordinances regulating pollution, water
conservation and usage, natural resource protection, and zoning. This
controversy results from differing perceptions of the extent to which
4
such self-regulation should affect non-Indians.
This comment will examine one of the most critical aspects of the
civil jurisdiction issue-tribal jurisdiction to exercise land use planning and zoning control. With such jurisdiction, a tribe may regulate
or prohibit the development of reservation lands, and thus exercise a
measure of control over the future of its reservation. Without zoning
1. I & II C. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES (2d ed. 1904). See generally Wilkinson and Volkman, Judicial Review of Treaty Abrogation, 63 CALIF. L. REV.
601, 608-09 (1975).
2. E.g., Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S. Ct. 1670 (1978) (scope of right to appeal from tribal adjudications to federal courts); Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
98 S. Ct. 1011 (1978) (tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians denied); Yakima Indian Nation v. Washington, 550 F.2d 443 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. granted, 98 S. Ct. 48
(1978) (Washington state's assumption ofjurisdiction over reservations).
3. See, e.g., Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 663-64
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
States may delegate many of their powers, such as zoning, to counties and municipalities. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ch. 36.70 (1976 & Supp. 1977) (planning act for counties).
4. For example, the Secretary of the Interior has announced conditional approval of
a tribal zoning ordinance for the Fort Hall Reservation in Idaho which includes tribal
zoning jurisdiction over non-Indians. Interior Secretary Approves Indian Tax, Zoning
Laws, 4 INDIAN L. REP. (AM. INDIAN L. TRAINING PROGRAM) § 0-7 (1977). The Secretary
gave limited attention to the legal basis for the approval. See Memorandum from H.
Gregory Austin, Solicitor for the Department of the Interior 21-25 (Oct. 13, 1976) (regarding tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians in civil matters and approval of various tribal ordinances). It should be noted, however, that less than four percent of the reservation is owned by non-Indians. Interior Secretary Approves Indian Tax, Zoning Laws,
supra § 0-8; Memorandum from H. Gregory Austin, supraat 3. Whether such approval
would be extended to a reservation primarily owned by non-Indians is uncertain. See
Part II-A infra.
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jurisdiction, most tribes would be forced to submit to the judgments
5
of non-Indians about the uses of reservation lands.
An introduction to the history and patterns of land ownership on
Indian reservations is important to an understanding of the clashes
between Indian and non-Indian reservation residents. Equally important is the recognition that tribes have certain inherent controls over
reservation lands, resources, and activities. Following a brief development of these background issues, this comment examines federal diminutions of tribal sovereignty and their possible application to tribal
zoning powers. It concludes that specific federal enactments that have
been asserted as support for state zoning powers do not in fact
transfer such jurisdiction to the states; that the exercise of state zoning
jurisdiction may be preempted by federal enactments and tribal laws;
and that state zoning would, in any event, constitute impermissible
infringement on any tribal zoning schemes.
Finally, since federal law in this area is in the process of significant
change, this comment concludes with an analysis of the underlying
political considerations that may ultimately determine the extent to
which Indians will be allowed to regulate land use on their reservations.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

Ownership of Indian Lands

Indian reservation lands are not owned exclusively by Indians.
Treaties with particular tribes 6 and the more general Dawes Act (also
known as the General Allotment Act) 7 of 1887 authorized mandatory
allotments of parcels of reservation lands to individual Indians under
5. The conflict can be seen by comparing tribal planning and zoning on the Swinomish Reservation in Washington State with that undertaken by Skagit County, in
which the reservation is located. About 80% of the reservation has been placed in a forest zone by the tribe in an attempt to preserve the natural character of the reservation.
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Zoning Ordinance (July 2, 1976). The county, on
the other hand, has zoned this portion of the reservation for residential and industrial
uses. Skagit County, Wash., Interim Zoning Ordinance 4081 (1966).
6. E.g., Treaty with the Omahas, Mar. 16, 1854, 10 Stat. 1043 (incorporated by reference in several other treaties); Treaty with the Oneida Nation, June I, 1798 (unpublished treaty), cited in F. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 206 n.4 (1942)

(first allotments of tribal lands to individuals). See F. COHEN, supra at 63-64, 206-07.
7. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current version at
25 U.S.C. §§ 331-358 (1976)).
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conditions of trusteeship imposed by the federal government. 8 Under
the Dawes Act, for example, after a period of wardship, the Indian
beneficiary was generally entitled to private ownership of the land in
fee simple, free from all encumbrances. 9 The federal policy was to
change the character of reservation lands from tribal to individual
ownership. 10 Not all reservation land, however, was allotted to individual Indians under this system. On some reservations there remained "surplus" unallotted lands. 1 The federal government sold
much of this surplus land to non-Indians. 12 Also, after achieving fee
simple ownership, individual Indian allottees could freely alienate
their allotments.' 3 As a result, total Indian landholdings on reservations dropped from 138 million acres to 48 million acres between
1889 and 1934.14
Although the allotment policy was terminated in 1934 by the Indian Reorganization Act, 15 one legacy of the allotment period is a tripartite classification of lands on Indian reservations. Reservation
lands may now be held in trust by the federal government for the
16
tribes or for an individual Indian; or privately owned in fee patent
17
by Indians or non-Indians.
B.

Reservation Zoning

The systematic and coordinated utilization of land throughout a
given area, such as an Indian reservation, is a major goal of land use
planning and its handmaiden, zoning. 18 One prominent authority has
identified several rationales for comprehensive planning, including
8.
9.
10.

Id. § 5. (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976)).
Id.
D. OTIS, THE DAWES ACT AND THE ALLOTMENT OF INDIAN LANDS 8 (1973).

11. Readjustment of Indian Affairs: Hearings on H.R. 7902 Before the House
Comm. on Indian Affairs, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 15 (1934) (memorandum submitted by

Commissioner of Indian Affairs).
12.
13.

Id. at 16.
See id. at 17.

14.

Id. at 17.

15.

Indian Reorganization Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (current

version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976)).

16. Fee patent ownership differs from fee simple ownership only in that the private
ownership is derived originally from a federal government grant, or patent. See United

States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S. 321, 337-38 (1906).
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN

RESERVATIONS

(1974) (analysis of land ownership on each reservation).
18.

See N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 1.06 (1974).
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needs for a consistent approach that can adequately deal with all facets of varied local uses of land, a centralized authority that can fairly
determine the proper allocation of available resources, and a means
by which the local community can participate in choosing between alternate patterns for future development. 1 9 Local governments are the
natural entities to exercise these controls over their own jurisdictions.
Tribal regulations controlling development within reservation
boundaries are consistent with the traditional zoning powers of local
20
governments recognized in Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.
In Euclid, the Supreme Court concluded that local governmental authorities can determine the course of development within their jurisdictions, as long as the regulations are rationally connected to police
power interests in the health, safety, morals, or general welfare of the
public. 21 A significant distinction between the traditional zoning situation in Euclid and tribal zoning of reservations is that in the former,
residents have a right to a voice in the local government. Typically,
on reservations, non-Indians do not have the right to participate fully
22
in tribal governments.
Land use planning and zoning are particularly important on Indian
reservations because they not only provide a regulatory mechanism,
but can also serve to protect a relationship to the land unique to Indians. 2 3 In Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County,24 the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit struck down a state's attempt to regulate
reservation lands held in trust by the Federal government for the tribe
or individual Indians. However, no court has yet fully analyzed state
19. Id.§ 1.08.
20. 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
21.
Id. at 389, 394-95.
22. The extent of non-Indian participation depends on the governing laws of each
reservation. See Part III-B infra (discussion of some proposals that would allow non-Indian participation).
23. As Justice Black noted,
It may be hard for us to understand why these Indians cling so tenaciously to
their lands and traditional tribal ways of life ....
But this is their home-their ancestral home. There, they, their children, and their forebears were born. They, too.
have their memories and their loves. Some things are worth more than money ....
Federal Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1959) (dissenting opinion) (footnote omitted). Cf. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S. Ct. 1670,
1684 (1978) (issues arising under Indian Civil Rights Act § 202, 25 U.S.C. § 1302
(1976), "will frequently depend on questions of tribal tradition and custom").
24. 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). The court's
reasoning is criticized in Waldmeir, Local Land Use Regulations as State Civil Low:
An Analysis of the Santa Rosa Court's Interpretation of Public Law 280, 12 TULSA LJ.
425 (1977).
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power to zone reservation lands held in fee simple by Indians or nonIndians. 25 Resolution of this question begins with an analysis of inherent tribal powers to govern reservations.
C.

Inherent Tribal Powers

Under the generally accepted analysis, tribal sovereign powers are
not derived from Acts of Congress, but are the "inherent powers of a
limited sovereignty which has never been extinguished."2 6 Thus, Indian tribes originally possessed all of the powers of any sovereign
state. Although most external powers, such as the power to make treaties with foreign nations, were surrendered to the federal government,
internal tribal powers, such as self-government, can be extinguished
only by specific Acts of Congress. 27 Judicial interpretation 28 and con-

gressional actions29 have consistently recognized that Indian tribes
possess aspects of internal sovereignty.
25. A federal district court has held that a tribe does not have the power to regulate
uses of land owned by a nonmember corporation. Trans-Canada Enterprises, Ltd. v.
Muckleshoot Indian Tribe, No. C77-882M (W.D. Wash. July 27, 1978) (reversing prior
decision following motion for reconsideration based on Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian
Tribe, 98 S. Ct. 1011 (1978)). See generally Part III-B-2 infra.
26. F. COHEN, supra note 6, at 122 (emphasis in original). See Santa Clara Pueblo v.
Martinez, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1675-76 (1978).
27. F. COHEN, supra note 6, at 122-23.
28. Nineteenth century foundations for the recognition of tribal self-governmental
powers were most clearly articulated in Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515
(1832), wherein Chief Justice Marshall concluded that" [t] he Indian nations had always
been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial." Id. at
559.
Recent Supreme Court reaffirmations of the doctrine of inherent tribal sovereignty
include Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S. Ct. 1670 (1978) (restricting appeals to
federal courts from tribal forums), United States v. Wheeler, 98 S. Ct. 1079 (1978)
(holding that tribal powers to try and to punish tribal members not delegated by Congress but inherent attributes of sovereignty), Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 98 S.
Ct. 1011 (1978) (recognizing inherent sovereignty, but finding that tribal powers to try
and to punish nonmembers on criminal charges is not one of its attributes), and United
States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544 (1975) (holding that tribal power to regulate on-reservation liquor sales by nonmembers an attribute to inherent sovereignty).
The scope of these tribal powers is uncertain. See United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S.
544, 557 (1975) (reserving decision on whether tribe has independent authority to regulate distribution of liquor by non-Indians on the reservation). See Part II-B-2 infra
(discussing Martinez, Wheeler, and Oliphant).
29. The two most important congressional enactments confirming tribal internal
powers are the Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934)
(current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1976)), and the Indian Civil Rights Act, 25
U.S.C. §§ 1301-1341 (1976). The Indian Reorganization Act recognized the rights of
tribes to govern themselves and to enter into certain relationships with other legal entities. The Department of the Interior has interpreted the Indian Reorganization Act as
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Limitations on these inherent tribal powers come from two sources.
First, Congress has extensive general powers over Indians and Indian

lands, and can act to limit tribal powers. 30 Second, state assumptions
of jurisdiction over reservations, without congressional authority,

have been permitted when the interests of a state can be protected
31
without undue interference with tribal government.

II.

LIMITS ON TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY

A.

CongressionalEnactments

In addressing the issue of zoning jurisdiction, the first question concerns those congressional enactments that may be interpreted as specifically withdrawing from Indian tribes the jurisdiction to zone their
reservations. Federal statutes which may be so construed include the
Dawes Act 32 and Public Law 28033 in conjunction with the Indian
34
Civil Rights Act.
1.

The Dawes Act

The 1887 Dawes Act, or General Allotment Act, was enacted to
alter the land ownership patterns of individual Indians in order to

providing congressional confirmation of these inherent powers of local self-government. 55 Interior Dec. 14, 65-67 (1934). Tribal self-government is encouraged by the
Indian Civil Rights Act, which significantly amends a 1953 statute to require tribal consent to further jurisdictional transfers to states. Indian Civil Rights Act §§ 401(a).
402(a), 403(b), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321(a), 1322(a), 1323(b) (1976) (repealing Act of Aug. 15,
1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588), See Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits
of State JurisdictionOver Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 535, 538-39 (1975)
[hereinafter Goldberg]; text accompanying notes 51-53 infra.
30. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1676 (1978). The sources of this
congressional power are the commerce clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 2, and the federal government's guardian-ward relationship to Indians. E.g., United States v. Sandoval, 231 U.S. 28, 45-46 (1913). Congressional power to regulate reservation activities is
also based on federal ownership of Indian lands. See, e.g., United States v. Kagama, 118
U.S. 375, 385 (1886). See generally F. COHEN, supra note 6, at 89-100.
31. See Part II-B.supra.
32. General Allotment (Dawes) Act, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (current version at
25 U.S.C. 33 33 1-358 (1976)).
33. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280 67, Stat. 589, § 4 (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1360(1976)).
34. Indian Civil Rights Act § 402, 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1976); id. § 403(b), 25 U.S.C.
§ 1323(b) (repealing that part of Public Law 280 authorizing assumption ofjurisdiction
by states without tribal consent, Act of Aug. 15, 1953 Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat.
588).
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promote their assimilation into the dominant society. 3 5 The statutory
scheme provided for the allotment of parcels of reservation land to Indians under a twenty-five year trusteeship. During the trust period,
the allotted land could not be sold or encumbered. At the end of this
36
period, a patent in fee would issue to the allottee.
States have claimed that assertions of jurisdiction over reservations
are justified by language in the Dawes Act which provides that upon
the allotting and patenting of lands, "each and every member of the
respective bands or tribes of Indians to whom allotments have been
made shall have the benefit of and be subject to the laws, both civil
'37
and criminal, of the State or Territory in which they may reside.
The meaning of this passage is obscured by congressional failure to
specify whether each Indian became subject to state laws upon the patenting of his or her land, or whether all lands on a reservation had to
be patented before any Indian became subject to state jurisdiction.
Clarification is important because the allotment policy was terminated by the Indian Reorganization Act 38 of 1934; consequently,
most reservations include both privately owned lands and trust lands
that were not subjected to the patenting procedures.3 9 Parcels of each
are usually randomly distributed throughout reservations in a "check40
erboard" pattern.
If, as states have argued, each Indian allottee became subject to
state jurisdiction upon the issuance of his or her fee patent, states
would have jurisdiction over those parcels of reservation lands. The
federal government, however, would retain jurisdiction over lands remaining in trust status. Alternately, if the statute requires that all allotments on a reservation be patented before the reservation as a
whole becomes subject to state jurisdiction, then the federal government retains jurisdiction over any reservation that has any trust lands
remaining.

35.

See D. OTIS, supranote 10, at 8-9.

36.
37.
38.

General Allotment (Dawes) Act § 5 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 348 (1976)).
Id. § 6 (current version at 25 U.S.C. § 349).
Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 1, 48 Stat. 984 (cur-

rent version at 25 U.S.C. § 461 (1976)).
39. U.S. DBP'T OF COMMERCE, FEDERAL AND STATE INDIAN RESERVATIONS (1974)

(list of reservations and land ownership status of each).
40. See, e.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463, 478
(1976).
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Although the Dawes Act has never been explicitly repealed, the interpretation of the provision transferring jurisdiction to states should
no longer be open to question. First, the ambiguous language of the
pertinent provision has most recently been construed to require the
patenting of all reservation lands prior to the transfer of jurisdiction
to states. 41 Second, the Supreme Court has disfavored checkerboard
jurisdiction, under which different authorities would be responsible
for various tracts of reservation lands, depending upon the ownership
of the lands. 42 Third, even assuming that the intent of Congress as expressed in the allotment acts was to checkerboard the reservations,
subsequent federal statutes clearly vitiate the continuing effect of that
intent. 43 Finally, and most persuasively, because the assimilation purposes of the allotment acts have not been fulfilled, 44 the legislative intent behind the jurisdictional transfers of the Dawes Act can no longer
45
be used as support for such transfers.
State jurisdiction to zone reservations under the Dawes Act would
41. Omaha Tribe v. Village of Walthill, 334 F. Supp. 823, 836 (D. Neb. 1971), aff'd
per curiam, 460 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107 (1973) (construing identical language in a specific allotment act).
42. The Court rejected an argument basing state jurisdiction on the Dawes Act:
[The] argument rests upon the fact that where the existence or nonexistence of
an Indian reservation, and therefore the existence or nonexistence of federal jurisdiction, depends upon the ownership of particular parcels of land, law enforcement
officers operating in the area will find it necessary to search tract books in order to
determine whether criminal jurisdiction over each particular offense, even though
committed within the reservation, is in the State or Federal Government.
Moe v. Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes of the Flathead Reservation, 425 U.S.
463, 478 (1976) (quoting Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U.S. 351, 358 (1962)). But
see Rosebud Sioux Tribe v. Kneip, 430 U.S. 584, 630 (1977) (Marshall, J. dissenting)
(criticizing majority decision for creating checkerboard jurisdiction problem).
43. Many federal jurisdictional statues refer to "Indian country." E.g., Public Law
280, § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976) (civil jurisdiction); Public Law 280, § 2, 18 U.S.C. §
1162 (1976) (criminal jurisdiction), 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976) (Indian country defined). It
has been argued that 18 U.S.C. § 1151 was enacted to negate the impact of the Dawes
Act by "expressly including within the definition of Indian country all allotted and patented land on reservations." Clinton, Criminal Jurisdiction Over Indian Lands, 18
ARIZ. L. REV. 503, 510 (1976). The statute defines "Indian country" as "all land within
the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent." 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976) (emphasis
added). Although this section deals with criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court has
noted that it applies as well to questions of civil jurisdiction. DeCoteau v. District
Court, 420 U.S. 425, 427 n.2 (1975).
44. See Omaha Tribe v. Village of Walthill, 334 F. Supp. 823, 836-37 (D. Neb.
1971), aff'd per curiam, 460 F.2d 1327 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1107
(1973).
45. In Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976), the Supreme Court found that the Dawes Act had been "repudiatccl" by the Indian Reorganization Act which ended the allotment system and provided support for tribal self-government. Id. at 479 (quoting Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 496 n. 18 (1973)).
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have particularly unfortunate consequences because checkerboard jurisdiction would result in county or city zoning jurisdiction over
certain parcels, and tribal jurisdiction over the remainder. Unless the
two regulating authorities pursued identical long-range goals and enacted identical zoning ordinances, contiguous parcels would often be
zoned for inconsistent uses. Land use planning is predicated on the
theory that planning the development or nondevelopment of a given
area will balance the competing needs of the residents and landowners, and will distribute land uses in a desirable pattern. 46 Checkerboard zoning authority exercised by different governmental entities
with different values and goals would present a serious, if not insurmountable, obstacle to the effectuation of the planning goals of each.
2.

Public Law 280 and the Indian Civil Rights Act

The other statutory provisions arguably supportive of state zoning
jurisdiction over reservations are found in Public Law 28047 and the
Indian Civil Rights Act. 48 Public Law 280 transfers some elements of

jurisdictional power over Indian lands from federal to state govern-

ments4 9 in six states.5 0 The Indian Civil Rights Act provides for assumption of jurisdiction by any other state so long as the Indian tribe
affected consents. 51 The Indian Civil Rights Act repealed the

46. See 1 N. WILLIAMS, AMERICAN LAND PLANNING LAW § 1.08 (1974).
47. Public Law 280, § 4, 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1976). Cases considering this argument
for state jurisdiction include Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977) (see note 57 and accompanying text
infra), Rincon Band of Mission Indians v. County of San Diego, 324 F. Supp. 371 (S.D.
Cal. 1971), rev'd, 495 F.2d 1 (9th Cir. 1974), and Snohomish County v. Seattle Disposal
Co., 70 Wn. 2d 668, 425 P.2d 22, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1016 (1967).
48. Indian Civil Rights Act § 402, 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1976); id. § 403(b), 25 U.S.C. §
1323(b) (repealing that part of Public Law 280 authorizing assumption of jurisdiction
by states without tribal consent, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 588 (1953)).
49. At the time of its passage, Public Law 280 accurately reflected the general direction of national policy toward assimilation of Indians and termination of tribal ties
and reservations. Nevertheless, it preserved many aspects of federal protection of tribal
members. See Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655, 662 (9th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977). Significantly, Public Law 280 did not immediately transfer to all state governments civil and criminal jurisdiction over all reservations, nor did it terminate the trust status of reservation lands. -d. at 662; West, Public
Law 280, in MANUAL OF INDIAN LAW F- I, F- I (3d ed. 1977); Goldberg, supra note 29,
at 538.
50. The mandatory states include Alaska, California, Minnesota, Nebraska,
Oregon and Wisconsin. 28 U.S.C. § 13 60(a) (1976) (civil jurisdictional transfers).
51. Indian Civil Rights Act § 402, 25 U.S.C. § 1322 (1976) (civil jurisdiction).
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provision of Public Law 28052 which provided for state assumption of
jurisdiction without tribal consent, but left intact assumptions of juris53
diction made prior to the repeal.
The expansion of population centers adjacent to many reservations
has increased the incentives for states to assert jurisdiction over pollution, zoning, and other aspects of reservation land use. But state pressure for regulatory control may conflict with current federal policy
encouraging tribes to develop and exercise self-governmental powers. 54 Public Law 280, as a product of a bygone era of assimilation,
has become a focal point in the Indian struggle for self-determination. 55 Judicial interpretation has been influenced by both the 1953
expression of congressional intent in Public Law 280 and by a more
realistic assessment of the place of the Indian reservation in society today.
In a recent decision, Bryan v. Itasca County,5 6 the United States
Supreme Court ruled that the grant of civil jurisdiction in Public Law
280 merely conferred upon states the jurisdiction to adjudicate private civil causes of action arising on a reservation, and not jurisdic-

52. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67, Stat. 589 (repealed 1968).
53. Indian Civil Rights Act § 403(b), 25 U.S.C. § 1323(b) (1976).
The states that have proceeded to assume jurisdiction under § 7 of Public Law 280 are
Florida, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 285.16 (West 1975); Idaho, IDAHO CODE §§ 67-5101 to
-5103 (1973); and Nevada, NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 41.430, 194.040 (1973).
Other states which had specific provisions in their enabling acts disclaiming jurisdiction over reservations were given consent "to amend, where necessary, their State constitutions or existing statutes ... to remove any legal impediment to the assumption of
.. jurisdiction" under Public Law 280. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 6,
67 Stat. 589. See also Indian Civil Rights Act § 404, 25 U.S.C. § 1324 (1976). Of the
eight states with such jurisdictional impediments, six have taken action under this section: Arizona, ARIz. REV. SAT. ANN. §§ 36-1801, 36-1865 (1974); Montana, MONT.
REV. CODES ANN. § 83-801 to -806 (1966); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. CODE § 2719-01 to -13 (1974); South Dakota, S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 1-1-12 to -21
(1967); Utah, UTAH CODE ANN. 33 63-369 to -421 (Supp. 1973); Washington, WASH.
REV. CODE §§ 37.12.010-.070 (1976).
The South Dakota statutes have since been held invalid by the South Dakota Supreme
Court, which found that the state statute establishing checkerboard jurisdiction did not
comply with Public Law 280 requirements for states with constitutional disclaimers in
assuming jurisdiction over reservations. In re Hankins, 80 S.D. 435, 125 N.W.2d 839
(1964). The Ninth Circuit has held a Washington statute creating mandatory partial assumption of jurisdiction unconstitutional as a denial of equal protection. Confederated
Bands and Tribes of the Yakima Indian Nation v. State of Washington, 552 F.2d 1332
(9th Cir. 1977).
54. Goldberg, supra note 29, at 538-39. See Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373,
388 n.14 (1976).
55. For an excellent and comprehensive analysis of challenges to Public Law 280.
.ee generally Goldberg, supra note 29.
56. 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
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tion to enforce their civil regulatory laws on reservations. The Court
relied on congressional intent5 7 and rules of construction requiring
that ambiguous statutes be construed in favor of the Indians. 58
B.

Unauthorized State Assumptions of Jurisdiction

Neither the Dawes Act nor Public Law 280 supports state jurisdictional claims to regulate land use and zoning on reservations. Consequently, tribes should be able to exercise their inherent sovereign
powers free from such state regulation. State jurisdictional forays onto
57. The failure of Congress to consider the implications of state civil regulatory authority over reservations led the Court to rule that the civil jurisdictional transfers of
Public Law 280 did not include such authority. Id. at 389-90. In Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County, 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 1038 (1977),
the Ninth Circuit discussed the implications of the application of state zoning laws, delegated to local governments, for Indian reservations:
[E] xtension of local jurisdiction is inconsistent with tribal self-determination
and autonomy. Were regulation of reservation affairs preempted by local governments, present tribal governments would be relegated to the positions of overseers
of tax-exempted property, or the board of directors of a business....
* * * [S] ubjecting the reservation to local jurisdiction would dilute if not
altogether eliminate Indian political control of the timing and scope of the development of reservation resources, subjecting Indian economic development to the
veto power of potentially hostile non-Indian majorities. Local communities may
not share the usually poorer Indian's priorities, or may in fact be in economic competition with the Indians and seek, under the guise of general regulations, to channel development elsewhere in the community.
532 F.2d at 663-64. The court accordingly held that the application of county zoning
regulations to the Santa Rosa rancheria is prohibited. An attempt has been made to distinguish Santa Rosa from Bryan v. Itasca County on the basis that state or tribal zoning
laws such as those discussed in Santa Rosa could carry "criminal" penalties, thereby
bringing attempts to enforce such regulations under the criminal sections of Public Law
280, while the taxation laws considered in Bryan did not carry such "criminal" penalties. Waldmeir, Local Land Use Regulations as State Civil Law: An Analysis of the
Santa Rosa Court's Interpretation of Public Law 280, 12 TuLSA LJ. 425, 430 n.9
(1977). Two difficulties exist with this analysis. First, it is unlikely that Congress intended that states could assume civil regulatory control over reservations merely because a state happened to provide "criminal" penalties for violations of civil regulatory
laws. If this were the case, tribes could control the exercise of state jurisdiction by choosing to impose "civil" or "criminal" penalties at any given time. Second, taxation
regulations are as susceptible of criminal-type penalties as are zoning regulations.
58. Public Law 280 is ambiguous because it refers to civil laws "of general application" and "civil causes of action" as if they were identical. See Public Law 280, § 4(a),
28 U.S.C. § 1360(a) (1976). The former would seem to include state regulatory laws, the
latter only lawsuits between private individuals. The Court chose the latter interpretation based on its analysis of Congressional intent, 426 U.S. at 379-83, and the "'eminently sound and vital canon' . . . that 'statutes passed for the benefit of dependent
Indian tribes ... are to be liberally construed, doubtful expressions being resolved in favor of the Indians.'" 426 U.S. at 392 (quoting Alaska Pac. Fisheries v. United States,
248 U.S. 78, 89 (1918)). Accord, Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 199-200 (1975);
Mattz v. Arnett, 412 U.S. 481, 504-05 (1973); Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 657, 675
(1912).
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reservations, however, have not been eliminated by the absence of
congressional approval. The following section will analyze unauthorized state assumptions of jurisdiction over reservations.
1.

TraditionalSupreme Court reconciliationsof unauthorizedstate
assumptions ofjurisdiction and inherent tribalsovereignty

Even without congressional authorization, states have successfully
asserted jurisdiction over some matters relating to reservations. 5 9 The
first modern Supreme Court attempt to reconcile decisions affirming
such jurisdiction with the concept of inherent tribal sovereignty was
Williams v. Lee.6 0 Recognizing the evolution of the doctrine of tribal
sovereignty in the early nineteenth century, 61 the Court put forth the
following test: "Essentially, absent governing Acts of Congress, the
question has always been whether the state action infringed on the
right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled by
them."

62

Subsequent opinions have focused on two elements of this test:
"Absent governing Acts of Congress" (preemption) and "infringed on
the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be ruled
by them" (infringement). These tests for state assumption of jurisdiction have proven difficult to apply. Their application to the problem
of state zoning jurisdiction is the next step in evaluating state claims
to jurisdiction in this area.
a.

Federalpreemption

The general doctrine of federal preemption withdraws from states
jurisdiction over those areas which Congress has made subject to fed-

59. See United States v. Candelaria, 271 U.S. 432 (1926) (quiet title action brought
on behalf of a tribe against non-Indians by federal attorneys in state courts); Thomas v.
Gay, 169 U.S. 264 (1898) (state taxation of non-Indian owned cattle on the reservation); Draper v. United States, 164 U.S. 240 (1896) (state criminal jurisdiction over
murder of non-Indian by non-Indian on reservation); Felix v. Patrick, 145 U.S. 317
(1892) (reference to state jurisdiction over fraud action brought by an Indian against a
non-Indian); Utah & N. Ry. Co. v. Fisher, 116 U.S. 28 (1885) (state taxation of non-Indian held land on reservation); United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1882) (state
criminal jurisdiction over murder of non-Indian by non-Indian on reservation).
60. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
61. See Part I-C supra (discussion of inherent tribal sovereignty).
62. 358 U.S. at 220.
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eral control. 63 In the context of zoning jurisdiction, several arguments
support tribal claims that the federal government has preempted
states from exercising such jurisdiction. First, the United States Supreme Court has held that, at least under some circumstances, Public
Law 280 governs jurisdictional transfers to states after 1953.64 Also, a
recent Supreme Court case pointed out that the Indian Civil Rights
Act denied states the power they formerly had under section 7 of Public Law 280 to assume civil or criminal jurisdiction over Indian country without the prior consent of the tribe,65 thereby manifesting "a
congressional purpose to protect tribal sovereignty from undue influence."' 66 The Act arguably represents a congressional response to the
problems of reservation jurisdiction, which was meant to be comprehensive and therefore preemptive of any transfers not undertaken pursuant to its provisions.
Other more specific statutory provisions support the argument that
the federal government has preempted the field of reservation zoning,
at least over trust lands. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934
reaffirmed the doctrine of tribal sovereignty over all tribal lands and
the authority of tribal governments to assert that sovereignty. Specifically, it confirmed tribal powers to "prevent the sale, disposition,
lease, or encumbrance of tribal lands, interests in lands, or other tribal assets without the consent of the tribe. 6 7 Also, leases of trust
lands are regulated by two other federal laws that specifically restrict
8
the application of state and local zoning laws on reservations.6
63.

Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963), is a rela-

tively recent Supreme Court analysis of federal preemption.
64. Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S. 423 (197 1). The Blackfeet Tribal Council
had attempted to cede concurrent jurisdiction to Montana by tribal statute. Id. at 425.
The Supreme Court ruled that, notwithstanding the inherent sovereignty of the tribe, the
transfer was ineffective because the Indian Civil Rights Act requires a vote by all tribal

members to consent to the passage of jurisdiction to states where the subject matter of
the transfer is within the terms of the Act. Id. at 428-29 (quoting Indian Civil Rights Act
§ 406, 25 U.S.C. § 1326 (1976)).

65. Indian Civil Rights Act § 403(b), 25 U.S.C. §1323(b) (1976) (repealing Act of
Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, § 7, 67 Stat. 589). See text accompanying notes 5153 supra.

66. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 98 S. Ct. 1670, 1680 (1978).
67. 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976) (originally enacted as Indian Reorganization Act of
1934, Pub. L. No. 73-383, § 16, 48 Stat. 984).
68. Congress has provided that the Secretary of the Interior shall oversee all leases
or extensions of leases of trust lands, and shall specifically examine, inter alia, "the effect on the environment of the uses to which the leased lands will be subject" and the "relationship between the use of the leased lands and the use of neighboring lands; the

height, quality, and safety of any structures." 25 U.S.C. § 415 (1976). Also, federal regulations promulgated pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 2 (1976) (powers to manage all Indian af-

689

Washington Law Review

Vol. 53: 677, 1978

Finally, Congress has provided that the term "Indian country," as
used in certain jurisdictional statutes, includes all lands within the exterior boundaries of reservations. 69 Such lands are considered Indian
country "notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, ''7 0 which suggests a congressional intent to treat each reservation as a jurisdictional
whole. 7 1 The authority to zone fee patent lands would, accordingly,
72
follow the authority to zone trust lands.
The Supreme Court has not yet addressed the issue of preemption
as applied to land use and zoning regulations on reservations. In
Santa Rosa Band of Indians v. Kings County,73 the Ninth Circuit

found that the county was preempted from applying its zoning laws to
reservation lands. The holding of the court was limited to the issue of
zoning jurisdiction over trust lands, as there were no fee patent lands
on the reservation.7 4 The Santa Rosa reasoning, however, is not so
limited. The court extended several Supreme Court cases applying the
preemption doctrine under varying circumstances.7 5 It concluded that
state attempts to zone reservations have been preempted. The appellate court supported its view that Congress intended to preempt and
reserve to the federal government jurisdiction not explicitly granted to
states by reference to the following: the Indian Reorganization Act,
which established the trust relationship, authorized tribal constitutions, and supported tribal self-government; 7 6 the "historical backfairs and matters delegated to the Commissioner of Indian Affairs under direction of
the Secretary of the Interior) provide that no state zoning laws shall apply to any trust
lands whether leased or not unless specifically approved. 25 C.F.R. § 1.4 (1977).
69. 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (1976).
70. Id.
71. See note 47 supra.
72. The distinctions between tribal and federal authority to zone land held in trust
by the federal government for individual Indians are beyond the scope of this comment.
For a current interpretation by the Department of the Interior, see Memorandum from
Thomas W. Fredericks, Associate Solicitor for Indian Affairs, to the Assistant Secretary
for Indian Affairs, Department of the Interior (Jan. 19, 1978) (on file with Washington
Law Review).
73. 532 F.2d 655 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977).
74. Id. at 657.
75. The leading cases are McClanahan v. State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164 (1973)
(preemption precluded application of state income tax to reservation Indian who
earned all of her income from reservation sources); Kennerly v. District Court, 400
U.S. 423 (1971) (see note 64 supra); and Warren Trading Post v. Arizona Tax Comm'n,
380 U.S. 685 (1965) (state preempted from assessing gross receipts tax on federally licensed trader on the reservation). McClanahan extended Warren in holding that specifically controlling federal statutes are not necessary for a finding of preemption, and that
more general expressions of congressional intent can be sufficient. 411 U.S. at 170, n.6.
76. 532 F.2d at 658.
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drop of tribal sovereignty"; 77 the existence of federal criminal justice
systems for reservations;7 8 congressional grants of power to tribal
governing authorities;7 9 and Public Law 280's definition of the limits
of jurisdiction granted" 'P.L. 280 states.' "80
Conflict of the county ordinances with federal regulations for trust
lands 8 1 was one basis for the decision. However, the two arguments
apparently most persuasive to the Ninth Circuit were that state as82
sumption of jurisdiction is preempted except as explicitly conferred
by Public Law 280 or the Indian Civil Rights Act, and that Congress
did not intend to transfer zoning jurisdiction to states, because tribal
self-government would thereby have been destroyed. 83 These arguments apply to all reservation lands, trust or fee.
b.

Infringement

The preemption test looks to conflicts between federal and state
laws. The infringement test, on the other hand, looks to conflicts between state laws and tribal rights to self-government. According to the
84
Supreme Court in McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Commission,
the preemption test should be emphasized because it is more helpful
in resolving the practical aspects of disputes. Inherent tribal sovereignty is to be used primarily as a background for interpretation of
treaties and statutes. 85 Under the infringement analysis, unauthorized
state assumptions of jurisdiction are valid only to the extent that tribal
self-government is not thereby impaired. 86 The usefulness of infringement reasoning is open to question, as courts generally follow McClanahan in emphasizing the preemption test. 87 Nevertheless, examina77.
78.

Id.

Id. at 658, n.2. See generally 18 U.S.C. §§ 1152, 1153 (1976); Goldberg, supra
note 29, at 540-44.
79. 532 F.2d at 658 n.2, 659. See generally United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544
(1975); 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976); id. § 1302 etseq.
80. 532 F.2d at 659. States granted jurisdiction under Public Law 280 are listed in
note 50 supra.
81. 532 F.2d at 664-65.
82. Id. at 658-59.
83. Id. at 663-64, quoted in note 57 supra.
84. 411 U.S. 164 (1973).
85. Id. at 172.
86. Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 219-20 (1959).
87. E.g., Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976); Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145 (1973); Kennerly v. District Court, 400 U.S.
423 (1971). The two most recent cases interpreting the infringement doctrine are Moe
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tion of complicated questions such as zoning jurisdiction benefits
from an infringement analysis because, unlike the preemption test, it
looks to the actual effects state jurisdiction would have on tribal governments.
In order successfully to urge the infringement test as a barrier to
state zoning jurisdiction, tribes must be prepared to show that the
state or local zoning ordinances conflict with actual self-governmental
activities of the tribe. 88 This would present a problem for those Indian
tribes that lack the resources to fund professionally-prepared comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances. In addition, many reservations
are too small in both area and population to justify extensive land use
planning and zoning regulations. Some tribes, however, have undertaken comprehensive planning, implemented by professionally-prepared zoning ordinances. 89 Under such circumstances, it should not
be difficult to show that state or local zoning ordinances that conflict
with tribally-authorized plans do in fact infringe upon tribal self-governmental powers. 90
Although arguments based on an infringement analysis have not
been as persuasive to the Supreme Court as those based on the
preemption test, the issue of zoning jurisdiction presents a problem of
local and state interference with tribal self-government which cannot
always be resolved through application of the general preemption
doctrine alone. For example, a court may find that state zoning of
trust lands is preempted, but refuse to hold that state zoning of fee paand Fisher v. District Court, 424 U.S. 382 (1976). The Supreme Court used the infringement test in Moe almost as an afterthought to its analysis of federal preemption issues.
By characterizing a state tax on reservation sales of cigarettes by Indians to non-Indians
as imposing a "minimal burden" on tribal self-government, the Court avoided a full discussion of the infringement test, 425 U.S. at 483. In Fisher, however, the Court applied
a more extensive treatment of the infringement test. There, the Court held that state
court jurisdiction of a child custody proceeding previously adjudicated in a tribal court
"would interfere with the powers of tribal self-government." 424 U.S. at 387.
88. However, it can also be argued that, since sovereignty includes both the power
to enact and the power to demur from enactment, a tribe's choice not to participate in a
field of regulation when it clearly has the authority to regulate if it chooses, should also
preempt state occupation of that field.
89. For example, the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community of La Conner, Washington, has adopted detailed and comprehensive plans and zoning ordinances to regulate
land uses on the Swinomish Reservation. See note 5 supra.
90. Smaller tribes may wish to control the uses of their reservation lands by more
informal regulatory mechanisms, such as general guidelines and specific notice, hearing, and appeal procedures. However, a reviewing court may not view informal regulatory mechanisms in the same light as planning and zoning done in more traditional and
structured fashions.
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tented lands is preempted.9 1 The application of infringement reasoning would enable a court to conclude that state and local regulation of
checkerboard parcels of reservation lands infringes upon tribal selfgovernment and control of the reservation, and is therefore impermissible.
c.

Tribal preemption

More sophisticated variations of the preemption and infringement
doctrines are now being developed to analyze certain civil jurisdictional issues such as taxation, water rights, hunting and fishing, and
zoning jurisdiction. In Fisher v. District Court,92 the Supreme Court
mentioned that state court jurisdiction over a child custody matter
had been preempted by tribal laws implementing federal policy
clearly expressed in the Indian Reorganization Act.9 3 Subsequently,
tribes have argued that the enactment of tribal statutes preempts state
94
jurisdiction over other fields of law.
This "tribal preemption" doctrine elevates tribal laws to the level of
congressional enactments for preemption purposes by virtue of congressional language authorizing and supporting tribal self-government. Two conditions are probably needed for the successful use of
this doctrine. First, the delegation from the federal government
should be specific.9 5 Second, it appears to be critical that tribes enact
91. For examples of federal treatments of trust lands that may facilitate a finding of
preemption or supercession, see note 68 supra. In the absence of such specific regulation, a finding of preemption of state jurisdiction over fee patent lands is less certain.
92. 424 U.S. 382 (1976).
93. Indian Reorganization Act § 16, 25 U.S.C. § 476 (1976), cited in 424 U.S. at
387. See note 29 supra.
94. E.g., Confederated Tribes v. Washington, No. 3868 (E.D. Wash., Feb. 22, 1978)
(enforcement of state taxation of reservation cigarette sales preempted by comprehensive tribal regulations enacted pursuant to the Indian Reorganization Act); California
v. Quechan Tribe of Indians, 424 F. Supp. 969 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (enforcement of state
hunting and fishing regulations preempted by tribal exercise of regulations pursuant to
18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1976)); Confederated Tribes v. Washington, 412 F. Supp. 651 (E.D.
Wash. 1976) (tribal hunting and fishing regulations authorized by 18 U.S.C. § 1162
(1976)).
95. In Fisher,the Court relied on the general language of § 16 of the Indian Reorganization Act, supporting tribal self-government, to sustain the tribe's argument that tribal court jurisdiction over adoptions involving tribal members was in response to a delegation of power from the federal government. 424 U.S. at 387. However, the Court in
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe of Indians, 98 S. Ct. 1011 (1978), cautioned that the
general language of the Indian Reorganization Act would not support the argument that
the federal government intended that tribes have the power to try and punish nonmembers for violations of tribal criminal code provisions. Id. at 1014, n.6. Although the Oi-

693

Washington Law Review

Vol. 53: 677, 1978

comprehensive tribal regulatory ordinances and a plan for disbursement of funds through governmental programs such as day care, edu96
cation, and water, sewer, and road services.
2.

Recent Supreme Court analyses of tribal sovereignty

In addition to examining limits on the ability of states to exercise
jurisdiction on reservations, the Supreme Court has recently focused
on the extent of tribal power to regulate conduct on reservation lands,
especially the conduct of non-Indians. In its inquiry into tribal powers, the Court seems to be altering the traditional preemption and
infringement analyses by first examining congressional removal of tribal powers, and then, if it finds that they have not been removed,
looking at the effects of these tribal powers on the interests of states in
protecting the rights of their non-Indian citizens who live on reservations. Although their impact cannot yet be measured, the 1978 decisions of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe97 and United States v.
Wheeler 98 indicate that the Court is concerned with considerations of
fairness to non-Indian reservation residents who have no rights to participate in reservation governments. 99
Oliphant involved tribal power to try to punish a nonmember for
an alleged violation of a tribal criminal law on reservation land. Although the Court reaffirmed the basic doctrine that tribes retain elements of internal sovereignty not specifically withdrawn by Congress,
it recognized that many reservations are now inhabited by non-Indians as well as Indians. 100 Apparently in deference to the right of these
non-Indian residents, the Court ruled that powers that are
inconsistent with the "status" of Indian tribes, are withdrawn from the
tribes. 10 1 By "status," the Court seemed to refer to the relation of tribal governments to all reservation residents, as evidenced by legisla-

phant decision did not discuss the tribal preemption doctrine per se, the strength of its
language denying effect to the general provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act
must be considered.
96. Confederated Tribes v. Washington, No. 3868 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 22, 1978) (enforcement of state taxation of reservation cigarette sales preempted by comprehensive
tribal regulations enacted pursuant to Indian Reorganization Act).
97. 98S. Ct. 1011 (1978).
98. 98S. Ct. 1079(1978).
99. See Oliphant, 98 S. Ct. 1013 n.l, 1022.
100.

Id.

101.

Id. at 1021.
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tive, judicial, and executive decisions and policies. 102 The Court concluded in Oliphantthat the tribe does not have the power to try and to
punish non-Indians for violations of tribal law. 103 Although the Court
failed to give any substantial content to the "status" test, the political
circumstances of disenfranchised nontribal members were clearly
04
important to the holding.1
In Wheeler, the Court determined that tribal courts and federal
courts are not branches of the same sovereignty, and consequently
fifth amendment double jeopardy provisions were not violated when
an Indian defendant was indicted by a federal grand jury subsequent
to tribal punishment for the same incident. The Court applied the Oliphant "status" test to determine the nature of the tribal power to try
and to punish its own members: tribal powers endure unless they have
been taken away by congressional enactment, or are inconsistent with
the "status" of the tribe. 105 The Court reasoned that the tribal powers
that were lost by reason of their dependent "status" are those powers
involving the relations between an Indian tribe and nonmembers of
the tribe. Here, tribal powers to punish a member for violation of a
tribal law were found to be within the "status" of the tribe. Since the
tribal and federal governments are separate sovereignties, the tribe as
06
well as the federal government, could try and punish the defendant.
By reducing the jurisdictional questions to the issue of tribal membership, the Court greatly simplified what had become a very complex issue.
07
Extending Oliphant and Wheeler to areas of civil jurisdiction'
would be inappropriate for several reasons. In both cases, the Court
discussed exclusively issues of criminal jurisdiction, and gave no indi102. Id. at 1019.
103. Id. at 1019, 1021.
104. See id. at 1013 n.1, 1022.
105. 98 S. Ct. at 1086. First, the Court found that such powers have never been removed by Congress and that the power of an Indian tribe to try and to punish its members is an attribute of retained tribal sovereignty, and is not derived from federal delegation of authority. Id. at 1086-87.
106. Id. at 1087-88.
107. Distinctions between civil and criminal actions are difficult to draw,
especially when civil regulatory laws appear to carry criminal sanctions for noncompliance. Clark, Civil and Criminal Penaltiesand Forfeitures:A Frameivorkfor Constitutional Analysis, 60 MINN. L. REv. 379 (1976). Proper treatment of this question is beyond the scope of this comment. The problem has been analyzed in Waldmeir, Local
Land Use Regulations as State Civil Law: An Analysis of the Santa Rosa Court's Interpretation of Public Law 280, 22 TULSA LJ. 425, 430 n.9 (1977). However, the author's
approach is of questionable value. See note 57 supra.
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cation that it had considered the question of civil jurisdiction. In fact,
a 1975 opinion of Justice Rehnquist, the author of the Oliphant opinion, permitted tribal civil jurisdictional control over reservation sales
of liquor by nontribal members in spite of their disenfran1 08
chisement.
Distinguishing between criminal and civil jurisdiction is important
because the latter can present complex issues that cannot be adequately addressed by the Oliphant-Wheeler approach. For example,
the problem of the allocation of water rights on reservations cannot
be resolved by a holding that a tribe has jurisdiction over the waters
flowing on, through, or next to lands belonging to it or its members,
but not over the same water flowing on the land of non-members.' 0 9
Similarly, tribal and state checkerboard zoning jurisdiction would defeat the purposes of the comprehensive planning and zoning schemes
of each.' 1 0
A further limitation on the applicability of the Oliphant-Wheeler
analysis is its failure to give consideration to the traditional preemption, infringement, and tribal preemption analyses that have been applied in challenges to state jurisdiction."1 1 In shifting its focus from
"interference with tribal self-government" to the "status" of a tribe,
the Court has adopted a standard that appears to be more responsive
to claims that tribal governmental institutions are unfair, than to
claims that a state is infringing on tribal sovereign rights. The significance of this apparent shift is unclear largely because the Court neither justified nor acknowledged it.
The Court specifically addressed the civil jurisdictional powers of
tribal governments in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez.1 1 2 In denying
the right of a tribal member to appeal from a tribal civil decision on
equal protection grounds to federal district court, the Court noted
that Congress intended questions arising in civil contexts to be adjudi108. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557-58 (1975).
109. United States v. Bel Bay Community & Water Ass'n, No. 303-7012 (W.D.
Wash. Mar. 16, 1978) (order granting partial summary judgment to tribe and holding
that a single entity must control water management in the reservation area).
110. "Checkerboard" zoning jurisdiction is discussed in Part 11-A supra.
I11. Although Oliphant and Wheeler involved questions of criminal jurisdiction,
and the preemption and infringement tests have been primarily applied to questions of
civil jurisdiction, see cases discussed in Part II-B-I supra, the tests were formulated in
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1959), as a response to problems of criminal as well as
civil jurisdiction.
112. 98S. Ct. 1670(1978).
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cated in tribal forums. Review of tribal decisions was limited to
habeas corpus relief by the Indian Civil Rights Act, and the Court
concluded that any other de novo review of tribal decisions would intrude impermissibly on tribal governments. 1 3 The Court relied on the
intent of Congress to promote tribal sovereignty, and noted that
"[t] ribal courts have repeatedly been recognized as appropriate forums for the exclusive adjudication of disputes affecting important
personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians....
Non-judicial tribal institutions also have been recognized as competent law-applying bodies." 1 4 Because the right of an incarcerated defendant to a habeas corpus writ challenging the validity of her or his
confinement is of fundamental importance, Congress specifically provided for it in the Indian Civil Rights Act. The Court emphasized that
this was an exception carved out by Congress, and that in all other
instances, tribal courts and agencies are the appropriate forums for
the administration of tribal laws." 5 The Court did not directly utilize
a preemption or infringement analysis, although its language strongly
suggests a concern for the integrity of tribal self-government.
The Martinez dictum referring to "disputes affecting important
personal and property interests of both Indians and non-Indians" does
not distinguish between disputes about enforcement of tribal civil
regulatory laws and disputes between individuals. The question of the
proper forum for resolution of disputes between individuals arising on
reservations had been answered in favor of tribal forums by the Court
in Williams v. Lee." 6 Arguably, the language of the Court in Martinez indicates that it considers disputes about enforcement of tribal
civil regulatory laws to be within the powers of tribal courts as well.
The distinction between private disputes and general civil regulation
was clearly drawn in the 1976 case of Bryan v. Itasca County, 17 and
could have been utilized in Martinez, had the Court considered the
8
distinction critical in that setting."
The effects of Oliphant and Wheeler are unclear, especially in ar113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.

Id. at 1682-83.
Id. at 1681 (citations omitted).
Id. at 1681-83.
358 U.S. 217 (1959).
426 U.S. 373 (1976).
The significance of the distinction between tribal regulatory jurisdiction over a

subject matter, such as zoning, and the jurisdiction of tribal courts over disputes involving the application of such regulatory jurisdiction is questionable.
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eas of civil jurisdiction such as zoning. Although their holdings may
not directly apply to questions presented by tribal and state zoning
conflicts, their reasoning cannot be ignored. They give a clear warning that the Court will look closely at the underlying problem of fairness to non-Indian reservation residents when confronted with a question of tribal jurisdiction over nonmembers.
III.
A.

TRIBAL ZONING
PoliticalConsiderations

As demonstrated by the foregoing discussion, state attempts to zone
reservation lands, both trust and fee patent, can be challenged, and
tribal zoning of the same lands can be supported, under established
principles of Indian law. However, most reservations today are faced
with the political reality of non-Indian residents who cannot, as a
matter of right, participate in tribal government. This circumstance
should be considered by tribal officers and planners who are administering or contemplating zoning controls. A tribe with a reservation
that is ninety-five percent trust land, with a correspondingly small
proportion of non-Indian residents, will be in a better political position than a tribe with a preponderance of non-Indian residents on its
reservation.
Nontribal members typically have no right to vote in tribal elections, participate in tribal decisions, hold office, or serve as jurors. All
of these raise questions about tribal regulation of the uses of their
lands. Because non-Indians' complaints about regulation without representation are widespread,1 1 9 tribes should study possible compromises that preserve their rights to control their reservations, yet permit
120
non-Indian representation in tribal decisions.

119.

See

INTERSTATE CONGRESS FOR EQUAL RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES, ARE WE

GIVING AMERICA BACK TO THE INDIANS? (1976) (copy on file with Washington lbttw Re-

view).
120. A further consideration is the common fear that Indians may pursue their
regulatory programs in a discriminatory manner, in order to force non-Indians to leave
the reservation. However, the Indian Civil Rights Act provides equal protection and
due process guarantees to all persons appearing before tribal courts, which would include those bringing challenges to tribal regulations. Indian Civil Rights Act § 202. 25
U.S.C. § 1302 (1976).
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B.

Compromise Suggestions

One suggestion, contemplated by the Suquamish Tribe in Washington state, is to provide for non-Indian representation on tribal planning councils. Ultimate authority under this plan would remain with
21
tribal members, however, in order to preserve their control. '
Another possibility is to delegate ultimate planning authority over
predominantly non-Indian areas within a reservation to resident
planning commissions. Typically, most non-Indians settle in well-defined areas within reservations. Tribes could grant zoning powers to a
planning commission composed of, and answerable to, the area's residents. Tribes would, of course, restrict the exercise of the delegated
powers within these areas. For example, the tribe could regulate the
impact of the local rules on water use, pollution, aesthetics, waste disposal, and traffic volume on the reservations. Too severe restrictions
could, of course, render the planning commission's powers merely
cosmetic, and fail to address adequately complaints about non-repre22
sentation.'
IV.

CONCLUSION

The power of an Indian tribe to zone all reservation lands inheres
in its sovereignty over those lands, and has never been withdrawn by
Congress. States' attempts to zone reservations are arguably
preempted by congressional enactments, and would likely interfere
with the functions of tribal self-government. However, tribal plans for
the exercise of zoning powers should take into account the impacts of
such actions on non-Indian reservation residents. The care taken by
tribal governments to protect the interests of such non-Indians will be
influential in the resolution of this controversy.
Robert D. Wilson-Hoss

121.

Memorandum from Don Pratt, Planner, to the Tribal Council, Port Madison

Indian Reservation, Suquamish Indian Tribe (July 21, 1977) (on file with Washington
Law Review).
122. A study has also been made of the rights and powers of Indian tribes to charter

municipalities for non-Indian reservation residents. Gonzales, Indian Sovereignty and
the Tribal Right to Charter a Municipalityfor Non-Indians: A New Perspectivefor Jurisdiction on Indian Land, 7 N.M.L. REv. 153 (1977).
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